The Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-Specific Damages

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The Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-Specific Damages teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics as they relate to the administration and enforcement of antitrust laws — both domestically and internationally. Written by Kevin S. Marshall, this 375-page reference provides critical insight into the analysis and measurement of competitive injury and business damages for students, practitioners, consultants, and judicial officers.

Author: Kevin S. Marshall
ISBN-10: 1-933264-45-4
ISBN-13: 978-1-933264-45-5
Copyright: December 10, 2007
Pages: 375
Binding: Paperback
Size: 6 x 9 inches

Topics Include:

Economics of competitive injury and antitrust injury
The perfectly competitive model
Monopolies, cartels, and deadweight loss
Methods of proving antitrust damages — yardstick, before-and-after, market-share, and going-concern
Valuing lost opportunities and market foreclosure damages
Sunk costs, market imperfections, and the role of hindsight
Ex ante vs. ex post damage approaches
Economic authority and the limits of expert testimony in antitrust cases
Predatory pricing, market power, and cartels
Microeconomics vs. jurisprudential economics
Expert testimony quality control under Daubert

Chapter 1: The Economics of Competitive Injury
Chapter 2: Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss
Chapter 3: Quality Control of Economic Expert Testimony
Chapter 4: Antitrust Damages from Lost Opportunities
Chapter 5: How to Value a Lost Opportunity
Chapter 6: Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases
Chapter 7: The Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics and Microeconomics